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level? Will it do more? Certainly, the EU could act more aggressively to defend democracy and
the rule of law where these are threatened. First, the EU could bring more regular infringement
proceedings for all the illegal activities in which these governments are engaged. The Commission
did not act against Hungary’s corrupt deal with Russia concerning the Paks II nuclear plant. They
could take a harder look at actions like that and corruption of the public procurement process to
crack down on kleptocratic autocracies—cutting off the flow of EU funds to them where possible.
The Commission could also invoke Article 7. Even if member governments in the council do
not agree unanimously and sanctions are ultimately blocked, invoking Article 7 would at least
name and shame the government in question and force other governments to take a stand on its
behavior. They might even, as Kim Scheppele has suggested, trigger Article 7 against Hungary
and Poland simultaneously, arguing that neither should be able to block action against the other.
In the end, the most effective moves might involve EU leaders taking more courageous political
action. If Merkel and all the leaders of the center-right stood up and said that the behavior of
Orbán’s government violates their shared norms and expel Fidesz from the European People’s
Party, I think that could make a difference.
Those are some of the things EU leaders could do. Will they do them? Sadly, probably not.
Perhaps the Commission will try to bring more infringements or suspend some EU funding, but
I wouldn’t expect partisan political actions, because basically the principles and courage of the
political leadership on the center-right—as in the US—is inadequate.
To conclude, then, the situation is that Orbán is thumbing his nose at the EU and getting away with
it. Kaczyński is facing somewhat more pressure in Poland, but may ultimately get away with it
as well. The irony is that these governments are dependent on EU subsidies but denounce it. The
election of Trump makes action less likely, because the US was exerting pressure on these regimes
directly and certainly would have supported EU moves to censure them. That pressure is gone
with the election of Trump, who will instead embrace these right-wing autocratic governments.
Essentially, the situation is bad and not hopeful. Perhaps the only consolation in this period of
democratic decline comes if we take a longer term historical perspective. Democracy may be giv-
ing way to semi-authoritarian government in some member states, and those governments may
seek to control press and the independent judiciary, abuse refugees and religious minorities, and
build fences to keep them out. Still, we do not observe in the EU fully totalitarian governments,
locking up political opponents or rounding up religious minorities and killing them as they did
seventy-five years ago. So, perhaps the EU can’t stop states from sliding into soft authoritarian-
ism, but it can restrain them from becoming full dictatorships. One might consider that progress.
–
Hungary’s Illiberal Polypore State
Andrea Petö
Central European University
I WOULD like to start with a quote from a member of the Lukács School, the philosopher SándorRadnóti who described the political situation in Hungary by saying that “now Hungary is
dancing on the forehead of the world” in his talk at Eötvös Collegium in Budapest on 7 May, 2012.
The connotation is that Hungary would basically set an example for the rest of the countries—
not only in Central Europe—but globally. This type of dance is a risky activity. This statement
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about Hungarian vangardism actually has two premises. One assumes there is a secret script of
governance which is actually developed and copied by other countries, and the second assumes
that there is a transfer of knowledge and even a transnational network discussing and working on
the future of governance.
In 2010 and in 2014, Fidesz—in coalition with the Christian Democratic Party—won the elections.
Present polls indicate that Fidesz continues to be the most popular party in Hungary, and it could
win easily if the elections were held today. It would win the elections, possibility without a major-
ity, but definitely with a solid lead. During the past five years Fidesz has been under international
pressure to comply with written and unwritten laws, but the party continues to be very popular
inside Hungary. And despite taking over all possible policy agencies, state institutions, and fund-
ing opportunities—Fidesz has not encountered or invited the formation of any effective political
opposition.
This proves that Fidesz in the past five years has set up this particular form of successful gover-
nance which is not only producing a possible electoral victory but which, according to Radnóti,
shows new ways for obviously successful governance. In the past years, political scientists and
political analysts were forced to reconsider not only their analytical toolkit but also their concepts
to try to understand this new phenomenon—calling it “democratic authoritarianism”, “illiberal
state”, or “mafia state”, just to list few.
With the Polish sociologist Weronika Grzebalska comparing Hungary and Poland we argued in
our previous work about a new form of governance stemming from the failures of globalized
(neo)liberal democracy which created states that are weak for the strong and strong for the weak.1
Based on its modus operandi, we call this regime an “illiberal polypore state” due to the fact that
it feeds on the vital resources of the previous system at the same time contributing to its decay.
Hungary, indeed, is an example of this.
On the one hand, illiberal “polyporism” involves appropriating institutions, mechanisms, and
funding channels of the European liberal democratic project. Contrary to popular belief, Fidesz is
interested in leaving the EU. Rather, they wish to exploit its funding and political opportunities
while pursuing their own political agenda. On the other hand, “polyporism” involves divesting
resources from the already existing civil society sector in order to transfer them to the illiberal base
to secure and enlarge it. Moreover, just like the polypore usually attacks already damaged trees,
illiberals primarily rise to power in the context of weak state institutions, a crisis of progressive
parties, and the impossibility to adapt to liberal standards in the present. In a short time the poly-
pore state took over the judicial system, the media (by buying outlets, threating and destroying
others), appointed loyal professionals to the constitutional court, and changed the electoral sys-
tem. This polyporism of the state actually explains why the Fidesz government is so popular and
also how it is creating this modus operandi which is based on the ideas and resources of others:
the resources of the European Union, the ideas of the liberal human rights-based democratic sys-
tem. Its operation is also creating a system which is fundamentally new but built upon previous
patterns offering an uncanny feeling of familiarity with previous political practices. It does not
demand from voters a new understanding, let alone supporting new ideas or moving out from
their confront zone, but it creates opposition without a risk. Fidesz presents itself as a national
1See Andrea Petö, Weronika Grzebalska, “How Hungary and Poland have silenced women and stifled hu-
man rights”, The Huffington Post, 16 October 2016, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/the-conversation-global/how-
hungary-and-poland-ha_b_12486148.html accessed 26 January, 2017.
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remedy against the power of global elites, the voice of the “losers of globalization” (despite the
fact that they themselves are part of the winners).
There are three key tenants of illiberal polyporic governance which need to be understood in order
to account for its success and the growing weakness of progressive actors: parallel civil society, se-
curitization, and familialism. These three elements are key as far as the Hungarian “vanguardism”
is concerned because on the one hand they prove the existence of a “masterplan” and on the other
hand they affirm the existence and successful cooperation of international actors advancing the
agenda of illiberal polypore states. The goal of illiberal regimes in Central Europe is the “transfor-
mation of the transformation”—a reconfiguration of post-1989 infrastructure in a way that benefits
the new ruling elites and their voter bases. The key aspect of this transformation is the replacement
of previous civil society actors working within the human rights paradigm with pro-government
NGOs supporting the illiberal agenda. While the latter seemingly have the same profile and target
group as the previous ones, they operate within a blatantly different framework which is predom-
inantly religious and anti-modernist. This replacement is largely achieved through the ideological
distribution of EU and state funding, which leaves progressive NGOs reliant on foreign donors
and generally excluded from policy making.
To legitimize this transformation of civil society illiberals use the discourse of securitization. Hu-
man rights actors are framed as foreign-steered and potentially dangerous for national sovereignty.
Gender equality, open society, and minority rights are portrayed as an existential threat to the
survival of the nation. Securitization means that human rights issues become depoliticized. Such
issues are presented as the agenda items of existential enemies—rather than political adversaries—
with whom there is no need to engage in a meaningful discussion. It also legitimizes the use of
extraordinary measures against these perceived threats. Lastly, securitization also mainstreams
radical ideas, as was the case with the normalization of anti-genderism when Hungary officially
hosted the World Congress of Families in May 2017 in Budapest.
The illiberal counter discourse to the liberal human rights paradigm is nationalist familialism, ac-
centuating the rights and interests of families over those of minorities and individuals. Experts
and politicians reading the CEDAW report of Hungary were surprised by the concept of “fam-
ily mainstreaming” which partially replaced the concept of gender mainstreaming. By now, the
shift from the concept of gender or even women to “families” became one of the pillars of the
illiberal polypore state.2 Besides elevating families in their rhetoric, Fidesz also introduced new
redistribution policies based on family mainstreaming. While in UN and EU documents the latter
was a tool to strengthen the functions of family, in the hands of illiberal actors it became an alter-
native policy model to gender mainstreaming, an instrument for promoting traditionalist values.
Women’s issues are gradually substituted with family issues, and an apparatus responsible for
gender equality becomes replaced with one dealing with family and demography.
The Fidesz government can be interpreted in two ways as far as the legacy of 1989 and van-
guardism are concerned. One is that this is one of the last functioning parties which was born
from the 1989 political transition. As such, this is the last party which is somehow connected
to the push for liberal democracy so they know how to play the game. But there is another in-
terpretation of the Fidesz government, namely that they are dancing ahead towards this second
2Weronika Grzebalska, Eszter Kovats, Andrea Petö, “Gender as symbolic glue: how ‘gender’ became an um-
brella term for the rejection of the (neo)liberal order”, Political Critique, 13.01.2017, last accessed 26 January,
2017. http://politicalcritique.org/long-read/2017/gender-as-symbolic-glue-how-gender-became-an-umbrella-term-
for-the-rejection-of-the-neoliberal-order/.
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transformation. According to this view, the Fidesz government is basically playing this double
role of representing the past but also constructing its own future. The main question is how the
43% of the electorate who are the undecided voters in Hungary today will be responding to this
kind of Hungarian vanguardism. More important than the dance will be whether someone can
come up with a message that addresses those very real issues which are present contradictions in
Hungarian society, including very strong gender inequality. Illiberalism is not a backlash, after
which one can go back to business as usual, but a new form of governance; the earlier it is rec-
ognized the earlier resistance strategies can be developed. One can only hope that in this context
Hungary will be in the vanguard, too.
–
Authoritarian Drive in Poland
David Ost
Temple University
WHEN PiS (the Law and Justice party, led by the immovable Jarosław Kaczyński) moved tocrack down on the Constitutional Court within weeks of coming to power in Poland in
November 2015, many thought it was a politically unwise move. Why provoke opposition at the
very moment of coming to power, when even those who voted in opposition usually want to be
persuaded that those in power think of them too? And clearly PiS did have gifts it was anxious to
share, particularly the 500-zloty ($125) per month payment for every second child and all children
following, and—for the poorest families—for the first child as well.
But while they no doubt could have hidden their intentions a little better and restrained from
belligerent talk, PiS clearly felt a need to make sure there was no institution in the country with
any legal power to challenge what the new legislative and executive powers were intending to
do. The jury is still out over whether it was the wisest policy with which to begin the admin-
istration, since it engendered the birth of a new civic opposition movement—the Committee to
Defend Democracy—that is still strong over a year later. But there is no question that the attack
was successful, in that today there really is no institution in the country with any legal power to
challenge what the government is doing. Unlike Fidesz in neighboring Hungary, PiS does not
have a two-thirds majority with which to change the Constitution. Like Fidesz, however, it has
the same desire to change the Constitution, in order to justify its no-holds barred authoritarian
takeover of all levers of power. Having eviscerated the Constitutional Court by changing the laws
governing its operation and by refusing not only to abide by Court decisions it doesn’t like but
even recognize such decisions as legal, PiS has already established the principle that it can literally
do anything it wishes to do. Anything.
What about opposition? Technically, it exists, but PiS control of parliament makes it difficult for
the opposition to do much there. Using a technique first deployed in Hungary, PiS puts forth
most of its bills as “individual MP” submissions, not governmental ones. The difference is that
the former does not require public consultation, and these bills can sail through parliament from
start to finish in a single day. Bills as crucial and controversial as repoliticizing the civil service
or establishing direct government control over public media were both passed at this impossible
Stakhanovite pace. In these sessions opposition MPs are able to ask a few questions but not to
have their questions answered. Instead, the Speaker of the House just says “thank you for your
questions” and immediately calls a vote. Neither PiS nor opposition deputies have even been able
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